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THE HIGH COST OF  
MANDATORY CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION 
MARK E. BUDNITZ* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumers are being denied access to any forum in which they can bring 
their disputes with businesses selling the goods and services they buy.  They are 
prevented from bringing these disputes to court because consumer contracts 
increasingly include mandatory, predispute, binding arbitration provisions.1  
These provisions force consumers to resolve any future dispute by arbitration in 
lieu of litigation and to waive almost any right to appeal.  At the same time, 
arbitration, which is promoted as a more efficient dispute-resolution process, is, 
in practice, also unavailable to many consumers because its cost is too great. 
Courts have recognized that the expense of arbitration can preclude con-
sumers from utilizing the forum that an arbitration clause has made the exclu-
sive forum for resolving their disputes.2  In general, however, cases and literature 
on the issue understate the seriousness of the problem.3  This Article critically 
examines a sampling of arbitration agreements and the rules of the major 
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 1. See, e.g.,  Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A 
Call For Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1247 (2001) (describing mandatory arbitration as “set forth in 
a standard form contract, proposed by the business, and provided to the consumer on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis”). 
 2. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the consumer 
complainants would face prohibitive arbitration costs if they brought their small claims individually); 
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that excessive costs serve 
“to deter consumers from invoking arbitration”); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 605 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that prohibitive costs may “render the arbitral forum inaccessible”). 
 3. While recent articles have addressed consumer arbitration costs, they have not included an in-
depth examination of the difficulties of proving costs or a survey of arbitration agreements and their 
relationship to the rules of the major arbitration services.  See Alderman, supra note 1; Melissa Briggs 
Hutchens, At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the Costs of Arbitration in Alabama, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 599 (2002); R. Brian Tipton, Allocating the Costs of Arbitrating Statutory Claims Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act: An Unresolved Issue, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 325 (2002); Julia A. Scar-
pino, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A Proposal to Ease the Financial 
Burden on Low-Income Consumers, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 679 (2002); Robert Alex-
ander Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The TILA Class Action Reconsidered, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809 (2003). 
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arbitration service providers and concludes that the cost of arbitration is often 
prohibitively high, either because consumers simply cannot afford the fees 
attendant to filing and prosecuting a claim, or because the costs of bringing a 
claim outweigh the benefits of any potential remedies.  Having relinquished 
their right to access the courts, consumers precluded in this way from arbitrat-
ing their claims have no legal means of obtaining a remedy for a business’s ille-
gal conduct.  To compound the problem, because of the many contingencies 
upon which arbitration costs depend, and because the courts have been unable 
to articulate workable standards, it is difficult for consumers to prove, ex ante, 
in court that high costs preclude them from arbitrating their claims.  Mandatory 
arbitration thus threatens the integrity of the nation’s dispute-resolution system, 
a situation that demands correction by Congress. 
Part II of this Article surveys the rules of the major arbitration service pro-
viders, reported cases, and the terms commonly found in arbitration agreements 
in an effort to begin to provide a picture of the actual costs consumers face in 
arbitration.  In doing so, it examines the many factors that enter into the calcu-
lation of arbitration costs.  To understand the common arbitration-clause terms 
that can make arbitration more expensive, a survey was conducted of the arbi-
tration agreements of thirty-one companies.  Fourteen agreements were col-
lected from their description in case law, and seventeen were collected from 
other sources.4  These agreements provide a rich source of empirical informa-
tion on how agreements impose costs on consumers beyond what is indicated in 
the fee schedules of arbitration providers. 
Part III showcases the fact that, notwithstanding the known costs of arbitra-
tion, consumers have great difficulty proving to the courts that the costs they 
face are prohibitively high because the cost of arbitration depends on matters 
 
 4. Agreements from the following cases, all decided after Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), were included in the survey: Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th 
Cir. 2002); American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002); Acorn v. House-
hold International, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Dabney v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 
No. CIV. A. 00-5831, 2001 WL 410543 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2001); Hale v. First USA Bank, No. 
00CIV5406JGK, 2001 WL 687371 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2001); Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 
(S.D. Miss. 2001); Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002); Bank America Housing Services v. 
Witherspoon, 833 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 2002); Cavalier Manufacturing., Inc. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 
2001); East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2002); Parkerson v. Wayne Smith, 817 So. 2d 529 
(Miss. 2002); Garcia v. Wayne Homes, LLC, 2002 Ohio 1884 (Ct. App. 2002); Pyburn v. Bill Heard 
Chevrolet, 63 S.W.2d (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); and State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 
2002).  The survey also included arbitration agreements mailed to consumers by business establish-
ments in 2002, agreements posted on popular websites, and agreements compiled in connection with a 
book, F. PAUL BLAND ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 2002) (including 
copies of arbitration agreements in a CD-ROM accompanying the book).  These agreements included 
those used by the following companies: AT&T Broadband, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank, 
DirecTV, Discover, First Union, MBNA, Sears, Sam’s Club, SouthTrust Bank, Sprint, eBay, Dell, 
Lending Tree, Amazon, Gateway, and PayPal (whose contract was declared unconscionable in Comb v. 
PayPal, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).  The companies surveyed represent a variety of indus-
tries that sell goods, offer financial services, and conduct Internet transactions.  Some of the industries 
included have a customer base numbering in the millions.  All the agreements listed herein are referred 
to collectively as “the Survey” in the text.  A graphic summary of the findings of the Survey is on file 
with Law and Contemporary Problems.  Copies of all arbitration agreements not drawn from case law 
are on file with the author. 
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that cannot be predicted with certainty and because courts have not been able 
to formulate a coherent analytical framework for such a claim. 
Part IV highlights the additional problem that, even if the costs of arbitra-
tion were determinable before the fact, and even if the courts agreed on how 
this should be done, they have not been able to develop a unified, workable 
theory on which to invalidate an arbitration agreement on grounds of prohibi-
tive expense.  While some courts find such agreements unconscionable, others 
strike them down as precluding the vindication of statutory rights.  Both 
approaches are flawed.  Part V therefore concludes that legislative or regulatory 
approaches should be adopted to ameliorate this denial of access to justice.  
Two possible strategies are put forward.  One is to establish a regulatory struc-
ture in which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would regulate consumer 
arbitration to ensure that costs are reasonable.  Alternatively, Congress could 
flatly prohibit the use of predispute arbitration agreements in consumer trans-
actions, allowing consumers to consider the benefits and costs of arbitration 
once a dispute arises, but not beforehand. 
II 
THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 
This Part examines the rules of the major national arbitration service pro-
viders and the interaction of those rules with the terms of the arbitration 
agreements included in the Survey, with a view toward estimating the costs con-
sumers face in bringing their disputes to arbitration and identifying the many 
variables that can affect the size of those costs.  Though the service providers 
charge modest fees for claims involving small amounts of damages, arbitration 
agreements often impose restrictions that make actual costs prohibitively high.  
For substantial claims, the services’ fees alone likely make access to arbitration 
infeasible, and actual costs are often made even greater by the terms of the arbi-
tration agreement. 
A. The Fees of the Arbitration Service Providers 
An examination of the fees charged by arbitration service providers demon-
strates that the costs are often so high consumers are denied access to arbitra-
tion and, therefore, to any dispute-resolution forum.  This section surveys how 
three leading arbitration services assess their charges.  The fees charged by the 
services vary according to the damages claimed, procedures selected, and arbi-
trators chosen.  This section analyzes the services’ fee schedules for the full 
range of damages alleged in consumer disputes, which involve damage claims 
ranging from the very small to the very large.5 
 
 5. See, e.g., Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae app. 26-27, Allied-
Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (No. 93-1001) (stating that more than one-third of 
the claims it arbitrates involve disputes over less than $10,000, with a third of the claims between 
$10,000 and $50,000, and, by implication, the remainder above $50,000), cited in Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 
at 280-81.  Most complaints filed with state and local consumer protection agencies in 2001 related to 
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1. The AAA’s Fees 
Effective July 1, 2003, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) issued 
new rules for consumer-related disputes.6  If a consumer’s claim or counterclaim 
is for less than $10,000,7 the consumer must pay half of the arbitrator’s compen-
sation, but the consumer’s responsibility cannot exceed $125.  This must be paid 
as a deposit at the time a case is filed.  Any unused portion is refunded.  If the 
claim or counterclaim is for between $10,000 and $75,000, the consumer must 
pay one-half of the arbitrator’s fee, but not more than $375.  Apparently, a con-
sumer with a claim of less than $75,000 is not obligated to pay any other fees.8 
If the consumer’s claim is greater than $75,000 or is “non-monetary,”9 the 
consumer must pay a partially refundable administrative fee as provided in the 
AAA’s commercial fee schedule.10  According to that schedule, the fee is $2,250 
for a claim between $75,000 and $150,000, and $4,000 for a claim between 
 
the home improvement, household goods, automotive sales, automotive repair, and credit/lending 
industries.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCACY ADM’RS & THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF 
AMERICA, ELEVENTH ANNUAL NACAA/CFA CONSUMER COMPLAINT SURVEY REPORT (Nov. 25, 
2002), available at http://www.nacaanet.org/publications/survey02.pdf.  Many of these types of disputes, 
such as with homebuilders and mortgage lenders, typically involve large sums of money.  See Jeff 
Gelles, The Big Problem with Mandatory Arbitration, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 8, 2002, at C01.  Other 
types of disputes can involve large claims because of consumer-friendly statutory damages schemes.  
Consumers have been awarded large damages in many cases involving debt collection.  See ROBERT J. 
HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 62-68 (4th ed. 2000).  Credit reporting agencies violating the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000), are liable for substantial damages, including punitive 
and intangible damages.  WILLARD P. OGBURN, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT  298, 300-04 (4th ed. 
1998).  Creditors violating the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (2000), may be liable for 
statutory as well as actual damages, including emotional distress.  See KATHLEEN KEEST & ELIZABETH 
RENUART, TRUTH IN LENDING 480 (4th ed. 1999).  State laws outlawing unfair and deceptive practices 
often provide for treble damages, punitive damages, and incidental and consequential damages, 
including pain and suffering.  See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND 
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 613-46 (5th ed. 2001). 
 6. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED 
DISPUTES (effective July 1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA CONSUMER RULES], at http://www.adr.org/index 
2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\..\focus
Area\consumer\AAA236current.htm. 
 7. The AAA fee schedule is based only on actual damages claimed; it is not affected by claims for 
“additional damages, such as attorneys’ fees or punitive damages.”  Id. at C-8. 
 8. Id.  The business must pay all of the arbitrator’s compensation beyond the portion the con-
sumer must pay, as well as administrative fees, hearing fees, and “case service” fees, all scaled to the 
size of the claims and counterclaims involved.  See id. 
 9. Id.  “Non-monetary” is not defined in the AAA rules.  Presumably, it includes a claim for 
injunctive relief.  Such relief is possible since the AAA rules provide that the arbitrator “may grant any 
remedy, relief or outcome that the parties could have received in court.”  It is unclear what justifies 
imposing the high fees for large claims on a claim for injunctive relief.  The law on what must be shown 
to prove the need for injunctive relief is well-developed, so the arbitrator need not engage in extensive 
original research.  Furthermore, a consumer justifiably seeking injunctive relief in arbitration is a con-
sumer in serious trouble.  She may not even have the opportunity to ask for an injunction because of 
the time and expense required to do so. 
 10. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES (amended and effective July 1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL RULES], at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\Nationa
l_International\..\..\focusArea\commercial\AAA235current.htm. 
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$150,001 and $300,000.11  In addition, the consumer must deposit one-half of the 
arbitrator’s compensation.  The rate individual arbitrators charge varies, and 
the AAA does not provide the rate until the arbitrator is appointed.12  There-
fore, in regard to large claims, the consumer cannot know in advance what the 
fee will be. 
In certain respects, the AAA’s new policy is advantageous to consumers.  It 
guarantees that consumers with smaller claims will not be faced with over-
whelming arbitrator fees.13  The costs, however, for claims between $10,000 and 
$75,000 are higher than if the consumer filed in court.14  Moreover, looking at 
the fee schedules alone presents a distorted picture of the true costs of arbitra-
tion, for an arbitration agreement may include terms that increase overall costs 
beyond those charged by the service provider.15  Lending Tree’s agreement, for 
example, precludes consolidated or class actions and bars the award of multiple, 
consequential, or exemplary damages, raising the cost of individual claims rela-
tive to possible awards.16  Thus, although the AAA ostensibly provides the con-
sumer a low-cost forum in which to file her claim, the arbitration agreement’s 
restrictions on damages and other terms may make filing a claim financially 
infeasible, or, at the least, alter the balance between the potential costs and 
potential recovery so as to discourage filing a claim. 
The AAA rules provide what could be a viable alternative in that the con-
sumer may file in small claims court instead of proceeding with arbitration.17  
However, small claims court may impose even more onerous restrictions than 
arbitration.  For example, many small claims courts do not allow representation 
 
 11. Id.  For claims from $75,000 to $150,000, the initial filing fee is $1,500, and the “case service 
fee” is $750.  For claims from $150,001 to $300,000, the initial filing fee is $2,750, and the case service 
fee is $1,250.  For nonmonetary claims, the administrative fee is $4,500.  Id. 
 12. See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 6, at C-8 (“The arbitrator’s compensation rate is set 
forth on the panel biography provided to the parties when the arbitrator is appointed.”). 
 13. Beyond requiring consumers with small claims to pay only relatively small fees, the AAA rules 
make some provision for indigent claimants.  The AAA’s Commercial Fee Schedule states that “[t]he 
AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on the part of any party, defer or reduce the administra-
tive fees.”  AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 49.  The Consumer Rules declare that in 
all disputes under agreements covered by the California Arbitration Act and all arbitrations conducted 
in California, consumers with gross monthly incomes of less than 300% of the federal poverty guide-
lines will be required to pay only actual arbitrator fees.  AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 6, at C-8.  
But see infra notes 78-83 (discussing the illusory nature of fee waiver rules). 
 14. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.publiccitizen.org/documents/ACF110A.pdf. 
 15. See infra Part II.E. 
 16. Survey, supra note 4. 
 17. See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 396 (Civ. Ct. 2001) (comparing the advantages, 
including the lower cost, of small claims court relative to arbitration under the NAF’s rules).  With most 
arbitration agreements silent on the point, many consumers may be unaware they can proceed to small 
claims court with their disputes.  Only two agreements in the Survey, Sprint’s and Sam’s Club’s, 
mention the small claims alternative.  See Survey, supra note 4.  The other arbitration agreements sub-
ject to the AAA’s rules not only did not mention this option but instead stated emphatically that the 
consumer had no choice but arbitration.  Consumers will only discover this choice after reading the 
AAA’s website, where the disclosure is buried in a mass of other information.  See AAA CONSUMER 
RULES, supra note  6, ¶ 2. 
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by counsel,18 and without a lawyer it is possible that a consumer would not be 
aware of the full range of statutory and common law claims available to her.  
Even if consumers knew about such legal theories, few would be able to effec-
tively litigate such cases without legal representation.  In addition, discovery is 
generally not available in small claims court,19 and approximately half the states 
do not allow equitable relief.20  Finally, because of low monetary jurisdictional 
limits, the consumer often will not be able to collect more than a fraction of the 
damages to which she is entitled under the law.21  In the end, arbitration under 
the AAA rules may be a more attractive option for consumers with small claims 
than small claims court, since the rules require businesses to pay most of the 
costs for claims of  $75,000 or less.22 
2. The NAF’s Fees 
The National Arbitration Forum (NAF) imposes a variety of fees depending 
on the amount claimed and the services requested.23  The following description 
provides examples designed to enable a comparison between the fees charged 
by the AAA and the NAF, and to illustrate the difficulties consumers have in 
estimating the cost of arbitrating under the NAF rules.  The examples assume 
the consumer has chosen a “participatory hearing,” which includes in-person, 
 
 18. RALPH WARNER, EVERYBODY’S GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS COURT 7/3 (7th ed. 1997) (listing 
numerous states in which attorneys and other representatives are forbidden). 
 19. Id. at 23/14.  The consumer may, however, be able to subpoena documents.  Id. at 14/6. 
 20. Id. at 4/15. 
 21. Id. at 4/1 (“The maximum amount for which you can sue in Small Claims Court varies from 
state to state.  For example, it’s $7,500 in Minnesota, $1,500 in Kentucky, $3,000 in New York, and 
$5,000 in Texas.”). 
 22. This financial arrangement, of course, has the potential to exacerbate another problem with the 
mandatory arbitration system: the potential for conflicts of interest on the part of arbitration providers 
beholden to the businesses that select and pay them.  Large businesses become “repeat players” in arbi-
tration, using a provider again and again, and providing it with needed revenue; the consumer, by con-
trast, is most likely a “one-shot player,” appearing before the provider’s arbitrators only once.  See, e.g., 
Alderman, supra note 1, at 1256-57 & n.84.  Even if arbitration services are not actually biased in favor 
of repeat-player businesses, the competition among arbitration services at least creates an incentive for 
providers to favor the company that designates and, in part, pays the arbitration service. 
One court has noted what it characterized as the irony in the issue of who pays.
 
 See Livingston v. 
Assocs. Fin. Co., No. 01C11659, 2001 WL 709465, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2001).  If a consumer or 
employee has to pay substantial costs, she argues that the high costs preclude the vindication of her 
rights.  On the other hand, if the business pays the costs, the consumer or employee may allege that the 
arbitration service is biased in favor of the business because the business is a repeat player and the 
service has an incentive to rule in its favor.  Although ironic, this arrangement also poses a serious 
dilemma for the parties to arbitration and the courts trying to determine how to resolve this problem.  
One court has approached this by determining that using one service presented a high probability of 
bias, while implicitly assuming that using another would not.  See id.  Such an approach, however, is 
fraught with difficulty, requiring a court to determine what services provide sufficient safeguards 
against bias even when the business pays all or most costs. 
 23. NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE, pt. VII, app. C (July 1, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter NAF CODE], at http://www.arb-forum.com/code/070103.pdf. 
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telephone, and on-line hearings,24 rather than a decision based solely on the 
submission of documents.25 
If a consumer files a claim for between $5,000 and $10,000, she must pay a 
minimum of $185.00 unless the parties agree otherwise or applicable law 
requires a different cost allocation.26  For claims between $10,000 and $75,000, 
the cost to the consumer varies depending upon the specific amount of damages 
alleged.  If, as an example, the amount claimed is between $15,001 and $30,000, 
the consumer’s minimum cost is $310.  If the consumer claims more than 
$50,000 but less than $75,000, her minimum cost is $490.27 
Beyond these minimum fees, consumers arbitrating under the NAF rules 
must pay additional fees for each request for an amendment, subpoena, discov-
ery order, continuance, stay, or time waiver, for reopening or reconsideration, 
or for any other type of dispositive or nondispositive order.28  A consumer 
claimant pays a $10 “processing fee” for each of these requests, with the excep-
tion of requests for reopening or reconsideration, which cost the consumer 
$200.29  Additional $100 fees apply if the consumer requests written findings of 
fact or conclusions of law (if not required by the arbitration agreement),30 or 
submits a post-hearing memorandum to the arbitrator.31 
Consumer costs under the NAF rules also vary according to how the arbitra-
tor or arbitrators are selected and what fees they charge.  For claims valued at 
less than $75,000, the parties may select a single arbitrator on “mutually agree-
able terms,” or each party may select an arbitrator, with those two arbitrators in 
turn selecting a third for the composition of an arbitral panel.32  If the first 
 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. See id. at 2-3, 18-19 (explaining that the term “participatory hearing” includes in-person, tele-
phone, and on-line hearings, whereas a “document hearing” is “[a] proceeding in which an Arbitrator 
reviews documents or property to render an Order or Award”).  If the hearing is held at the request of 
the consumer, she is responsible for half of the hearing session fee.  If held at the request of the busi-
ness, the business is responsible for the full hearing fee.  Id. at 38. 
 26. Id. at 38.  The consumer pays a filing fee of $35 and a participatory fee of $150.  The business 
respondent pays a “commencement fee” of $60 and an administrative fee of $650.  Id.  There also is a 
participatory hearing fee of $500 if the business selects such a hearing.  Id. 
 27. Id.  The filing fee is $240, and the participatory hearing fee is $250. 
A direct comparison between the AAA’s and the NAF’s fees is not possible, but the NAF’s fees 
would often be much higher.  First, the NAF’s fees are apparently completely exclusive of arbitrator 
fees, which are of course within the minimum costs of any arbitration.  The AAA’s consumer fees for 
small claims, by contrast, seem to be exclusively composed of arbitrator fees.  Second, the AAA deter-
mines the fee category in which a claim belongs by considering only the actual damages claimed, see 
supra note 7, while the NAF fee schedule is based on “[t]he total value of all relief sought.” NAF 
CODE, supra note 23, at 2.  Presumably, then, a dispute involving claims beyond actual economic dam-
ages would often be placed in higher fee category under the NAF rules than it would under the AAA 
rules. 
 28. Id. at 40. 
 29. Id.  The business respondent has to pay a “request fee” ranging from $50 to $250 (for claims 
under $75,000) for each request made by the consumer or the respondent.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 41.  Under the NAF rules, “[a]n Award shall not include any reasons, findings of fact or 
conclusions of law unless required by prior written agreement of the Parties or requested in writing by a 
Party before the beginning of any Hearing.”  Id. at 27. 
 31. Id. at 40. 
 32. Id. at 15. 
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method is used, each party must pay a $50 “procedural fee” for each scheduled 
hearing session.33  If the second method is chosen, each party must pay $75 for 
each session.  This fee is in addition to the actual fee paid to the arbitrator or 
arbitrators, which is to be “mutually agreed to by the parties.”34 
Needless to say, the costs of arbitrating under the NAF’s rules are difficult 
to estimate in advance of arbitration because they are dependent on a wide 
variety of factors that may not be known before a complaint is filed, including 
the type and number of hearings and arbitral orders required to resolve the dis-
pute. 
Like the AAA, the NAF has a separate fee arrangement for claims of 
$75,000 and higher.  These fees are considerably greater than those for smaller 
claims.  For a claim of $75,000, for example, a consumer requesting only a 
document hearing would be required to pay a filing fee of $750,35 a $2,500 
hearing fee, and a hearing procedural fee of either $100 or $150.36  For participa-
tory hearings, the consumer would pay an additional $1500 for the initial ses-
sion, plus $1,000 for each additional session.  The fee for requests for amend-
ments, subpoenas, discovery orders, or continuances or time waivers, for 
submission of post-hearing memoranda, for reopening or reconsideration, and 
for other orders would range from $75 for a subpoena to $2,500 for a dispositive 
order.37  A written opinion not provided for by the arbitration agreement or 
requested by the business opponent would cost the consumer at least $1,000.38  
Other fees would be imposed for expedited hearings.39 
The substantial increase in the fees for claims of $75,000 and higher may 
create a strong incentive for consumers to claim less than the law would allow.  
This perverse incentive undermines important objectives underpinning con-
sumer protection legislation: deterring and remedying egregious commercial 
conduct, and compensating consumers for injuries suffered. 
The NAF rules are subject to two important provisos: First, the fee sched-
ules do not apply if “otherwise provided by agreement of the Parties or 
required by the applicable law.”40  Second, the NAF allows indigent consumers, 
 
 33. Id. at 40. 
 34. Id. at 31. 
 35. Id. at 42. 
 36. Id. at 45. 
 37. Id. at 43.  The Public Citizen study defines a dispositive motion as a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment.  See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 14, at 46. 
 38. See NAF CODE, supra note 23, at 44. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 32, 38, 41-42.  It is unclear whether the rules allow the direct fees imposed upon a con-
sumer to be increased over those provided for in the NAF fee schedule.  The rules continually repeat 
that a fee will be imposed “unless otherwise provided by agreement of the Parties or required by appli-
cable law.”  See, e.g., id. at 38-39.  But Rule 44(I), which is referenced by the subsequent rules, seems 
only to contemplate that fees otherwise imposed on a consumer can instead be imposed on or absorbed 
by the business party.  See id. at 31 (“A Consumer Party may submit a statement to the Director stating 
that an agreement of the Parties or the applicable law requires an opposing Business Party to pay fees.  
The Business Party may be required to pay fees for the Consumer as provided in this Code and Fee 
Schedule or by the agreement of the Parties or applicable law.”). 
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defined as those who “meet the United States federal poverty standards,”41 to 
apply for a full or partial waiver of fees, which “shall” be granted if the con-
sumer qualifies under the NAF rules, federal poverty standards, or applicable 
law.  An NAF director “may order that the business [p]arty pay the appropriate 
fees” in lieu of the consumer.42 
3. JAMS’s Fees 
Compared to the AAA and the NAF, JAMS has a relatively straightforward 
and affordable fee arrangement.  But the JAMS rules may nevertheless sub-
stantially reduce consumers’ ability to pursue their full range of remedies under 
the law.  JAMS’s failure to explicitly permit consolidation of claims, class 
actions, and full business subsidization of the process raises additional concerns. 
When a consumer files a claim under the JAMS rules, she must pay a flat fee 
of $125 and no more, regardless of the services requested or the size of the 
claim.43  JAMS considers this fee to be “approximately equivalent to current 
court filing fees.”44  This is in sharp contrast to the AAA and NAF rules, which 
impose expensive fees and other costs when the consumer brings a large claim.45  
In addition, under JAMS’s rules, either party may file in small claims court 
instead of using arbitration.46  JAMS also refuses to enforce requirements that 
arbitration proceedings occur in only one location.47  Rather than force the con-
sumer to shoulder expensive proceedings in a far-flung location, JAMS requires 
consumers have access to an in-person hearing in their own “hometown area.”48  
It also requires that consumers be provided a “concise written statement of the 
essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.”49 
Although many arbitration agreements severely limit the remedies an arbi-
trator may award,50 JAMS refuses to arbitrate claims based on such clauses, 
insisting that arbitrators remain free to award any “[r]emedies that would oth-
erwise be available to the consumer under applicable federal, state or local 
laws.”51  JAMS’s general rules provide that the arbitrator must “be guided by 
 
 41. Id. at 5. 
 42. Id. at 32. 
 43. JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES: 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS ¶7 (revised Apr. 2003) [hereinafter JAMS 
POLICY], at http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/Consumer_Arbitration_Min_Std-2003.PDF.  All 
other fees must be paid by the business, including the arbitrator’s compensation.  Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56, 80-84. 
 46. JAMS POLICY, supra note 43, ¶ 1. 
 47. See Survey, supra note 4.  Several arbitration agreements included in the Survey, including 
those of Lending Tree, PayPal, and Amazon, required all arbitration hearings to take place in a specific 
location designated by the business.  See infra note 109. 
 48. JAMS POLICY, supra note 43, ¶5. 
 49. Id. ¶10. 
 50. See Survey, supra note 4.  For example, the AT&T Broadband agreement prohibits the award 
of attorneys’ fees or consequential, punitive, or incidental damages. 
 51. JAMS POLICY, supra note 43, ¶3. 
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the principles of law and equity” in determining an award.52  The parties nor-
mally may “specify a different standard,”53 but this allowance apparently does 
not apply to arbitrations governed by predispute arbitration agreements 
between consumers and businesses.  The JAMS consumer policy states that 
JAMS will administer arbitrations “only if the contract arbitration clause and 
specified applicable rules comply with the . . . minimum standards of fairness” 
contained in the policy.54 
The question arises how JAMS handles an arbitration agreement that pro-
vides that JAMS’s rules apply but that the terms of the agreement prevail if the 
rules and the arbitration agreement conflict.55  Presumably, if there were a con-
flict between such an agreement and JAMS’s consumer arbitration policy, 
JAMS would refuse to administer the arbitration.  However, many agreements 
designate not only JAMS, but also the NAF and the AAA as arbitral service 
providers,56 so the consumer might then be subject to the more expensive fee 
schedules of the AAA and the NAF.  Ultimately, JAMS’s consumer arbitration 
policy aids consumers only to the extent it persuades businesses to draft con-
forming agreements. 
An important but unaddressed issue under JAMS’s rules is whether JAMS 
will enforce agreements that prohibit claim consolidation and class actions.  
Businesses can use such prohibitions to prevent consumers from pursuing their 
claims in arbitration because individual consumers may find it financially infea-
sible to retain an attorney, and attorneys may find it infeasible to represent 
them, especially when their claims are small.57  Many consumer arbitration 
agreements include this prohibition.58  While JAMS’s policy statement does not 
directly address the issue of consolidation and class actions, the statement does 
say that the arbitration “clause or procedures must not discourage the use of 
counsel.”59  Consumers might argue that an arbitration clause prohibiting con-
solidation and class actions has exactly that effect and that JAMS should refuse 
to administer such arbitrations.  On the other hand, the general JAMS rules, 
which apply to matters not addressed in JAMS’s consumer policy statement, 
 
 52. JAMS, JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES, R. 24(c) (revised 
Apr. 2003) [hereinafter JAMS RULES], at http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/comprehensive_ 
arbitration_rules-2003.PDF (providing that if an arbitration agreement designates JAMS as the admin-
istrator without specifying any particular JAMS rules, the Comprehensive Rules and Procedures apply 
to the arbitration). 
 53. Id. 
 54. JAMS POLICY, supra note 43. 
 55. See Survey, supra note 4.  The Chase Manhattan agreement provides that the terms of the 
agreement prevail if there is a conflict between the agreement and JAMS’s rules. 
 56. See Survey, supra note 4.  The Chase Manhattan, Sears, and Sam’s Club agreements are exam-
ples. 
 57. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class 
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 
passim (Winter/Spring 2004). 
 58. Id.  The Discover, MBNA, Sears, Sam’s Club, SouthTrust Bank, PayPal, Gateway, and 
Lending Tree agreements are examples. 
 59. JAMS POLICY, supra note 43, ¶6. 
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provide that “[t]he parties may agree on any procedures not specified herein or 
in lieu of these Rules that are consistent with applicable law and JAMS poli-
cies.”60  Businesses may take advantage of the failure to clearly address this 
issue by arguing that an agreement prohibiting consolidation and class actions 
constitutes an agreement on procedure that is permitted under JAMS’s general 
rules.  The failure to clearly and unequivocally permit consumers to bring class 
actions in arbitration is a major deficiency in JAMS’s consumer rules. 
B. Examples of Costs from Cases 
The above discussion has described the fee schedules of the national arbitra-
tion service providers.  Another source of information is the opinions that dis-
close the costs in individual consumer cases.  The following cases demonstrate 
that arbitration costs can be substantial: 
(1) In Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp.,61 the agreement required arbitra-
tion under the AAA’s rules.62  The plaintiff obtained an affidavit 
from an AAA-certified arbitrator that the cost of the arbitration 
would likely be $48,000 and could be as high as $126,000.  The 
plaintiff claimed that this cost would be prohibitive, which the 
defendant did not dispute, and the court found that the plaintiff had 
carried his burden under Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph63 
in demonstrating that arbitration would be cost-prohibitive and that 
the arbitration clause was unenforceable. 
(2) In Phillips v. Associates Home Equity Services, Inc.,64 the plaintiff 
presented evidence that under the AAA Commercial Rules she 
would have to pay about $4,000 at the time of filing her claim.65  The 
court pointed out that many other costs would be shared equally by 
both parties, bringing the total cost to the consumer much higher.66  
The court found that the evidence on costs, together with evidence 
of the plaintiff’s financial condition, were sufficient to show that the 
cost of arbitration would be prohibitive. 
(3) In Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.,67 the arbitration agreement 
required a three-judge panel of arbitrators who would follow the 
rules of the AAA.68  A low-income consumer asserted a claim of 
$1500 and demonstrated he would have to pay $2,000 in fees up 
front, as well as thousands of dollars more to arbitrate his claim.69  
The defendant countered that the consumer’s costs could not be 
verified until incurred.  The court held it “unreasonable” to require 
 
 60. JAMS RULES, supra note  52, at R. 2. 
 61. 189 F. Supp. 2d 772  (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 62. Id. at 778. 
 63. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 64. 179 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 65. Id. at 846. 
 66. Id.  In addition to the filing fee and arbitrator’s fees, other costs, including travel expenses and 
hotel rentals, would have to be paid. 
 67. 45 P.3d 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 68. Id. at 598. 
 69. Id. at 599. 
BUDNITZ.DOC 10/14/2004  10:15 AM 
144 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:133 
a consumer to complete the entire arbitration process and incur all 
the costs to meet her burden of proof.70 
(4) In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,71 the agreement required the con-
sumer claimants to pay a $4,000 fee in advance, of which $2,000 was 
nonrefundable.72  With arbitrations limited to the Chicago area, the 
complainants, New York residents, would also incur transportation 
and lodging expenses.  Even if an individual consumer obtained an 
award, the consumers’ counsel estimated that the damages would 
not exceed $1,000.  Thus, the court held that arbitration was finan-
cially infeasible, and the clause substantively unconscionable. 
These cases demonstrate that the claim that arbitration is cost-prohibitive is 
not merely theoretical.  Consumers have been able to document as much to the 
satisfaction of the courts. 
C. Waiver and Deferral 
Notwithstanding the potential costs of arbitration, businesses argue some-
what disingenuously that access is not barred given the allowances for fee waiv-
ers and deferrals under the rules of the arbitration providers.  Both the NAF 
and the AAA offer fee waivers, deferrals, or reductions for individuals who are 
unable to pay.  A close examination of that offer, however, indicates that low-
income consumers cannot count on being able to qualify. 
The NAF permits a consumer to request a waiver only if she is suing for less 
than $75,000.73  Her request must be accompanied by an affidavit that contains 
information about her family’s size, income, resources, property, liabilities, 
debts, and assets.74  The NAF Director is required to “promptly determine 
whether the consumer is eligible for a full or partial waiver.”75  If the consumer 
is eligible, the Director may order the business to pay the “appropriate fees.”76  
The waiver does not apply to the fees assessed if the consumer requests written 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or reasons for the award. 
The standards for determining eligibility are not specified in the NAF rules.  
The Director is instructed to determine if the consumer is eligible under NAF 
Rule 45 or under “United States poverty standards or the applicable law.”  
There is more than one federal poverty standard, however, and the rule does 
not specify which the Director must follow.77  It is therefore impossible to know 
how the Director makes the eligibility determination under the rule.  There are 
also no instructions for deciding when a partial waiver might be more appropri-
ate than a full waiver. 
 
 70. Id. at 605. 
 71. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (S. Ct. 1998). 
 72. Id. at 571. 
 73. NAF CODE, supra note 23, at R. 45(A) (providing for waivers only in “common claims,” which 
are defined as claims for less than $75,000). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at R. 45(B). 
 77. The Census Bureau and the Department of Health and Human Services publish various meas-
urements of poverty at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.html (last revised Oct. 27, 2003). 
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The AAA also provides for fee waivers, reductions, and deferrals.78  For 
claims under $75,000 the only such mechanism available is for disputes based on 
arbitration clauses governed by the California Arbitration Act and arbitrations 
held in California.  In such cases, consumers with gross monthly incomes of less 
than 300% of the federal poverty guidelines are required to pay only arbitrator 
fees.79  For claims over $75,000, consumers are eligible to apply for a waiver or 
deferral of administrative fees, but requests are granted only at the service’s 
discretion.80  Persons are “eligible for consideration” if their annual gross 
income is less than 200% of the federal poverty guidelines.81  To be considered, 
applicants are required to submit a signed affidavit of hardship, and the AAA 
may consider their “income prospects” and assets.  Applicants must provide 
copies of federal tax returns for the past two years, bank statements for the past 
three months, and possibly additional financial records and documentation.82  
The AAA reserves the right to deny any request.  Even if the AAA responds 
favorably to a consumer’s affidavit, arbitration may remain unaffordable.  Cer-
tain fees, including the arbitrator’s fee, are not covered by the waiver policy.83 
In addition to the possibility of waiver, fees may be deferred until the con-
clusion of the case.  AAA policies do not explain how the AAA decides 
between deferral and waiver of fees, leaving much to the discretion of AAA 
administrators.  This discretion is premised on the recognition that “every hard-
ship request is unique and involves many variables.”84  While this open-ended 
approach may be appropriate, consumers cannot know in advance whether they 
will qualify for a waiver, a deferral, or neither.  Furthermore, whether discretion 
will be exercised fairly depends entirely upon the persons exercising it. 
The courts have recognized the general lack of standards governing the 
granting of fee waivers under the AAA’s rules and policies.  According to one 
court, the AAA rarely grants hardship waivers, and even if granted, the plaintiff 
 
 78. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, ADMINISTRATIVE FEE WAIVERS AND PRO BONO 
ARBITRATION SERVICES (updated July 1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA WAIVER RULES], available at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/focusArea/cosumer/Adminis-
trative%20Fee%20Waivers%20and%20Pro%20Bono%20Arbitrators%20Services.htm; see also AAA 
COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 10, at R. 49 (“The AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on 
the part of any party, defer or reduce the administrative fees.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Arbitration Association at 4, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph,  531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235), 
available at 2000 WL 744161 (“The AAA . . . has administrative procedures that allow deferrals or 
reductions in the AAA’s administrative fees where extreme hardship on the part of a party makes 
paying or advancing some or all of such fees inappropriate.  The AAA receives one or two requests 
each week for a waiver or deferral of administrative fees on the basis of economic hardship.  When the 
hardship is substantiated, these requests are liberally granted.”). 
 79. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 6, at C-8.  This seems a very small concession since the 
fees the AAA imposes on consumers in such disputes are solely comprised of arbitrator fees.  See supra 
Part II.A.1.  Perhaps this waiver allows consumers to avoid incidental expenses, such the fee for 
hearing-room rental. 
 80. AAA WAIVER RULES, supra note 78. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 319 F.3d 
1126 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 83. AAA WAIVER RULES, supra note 78. 
 84. Id. 
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has usually already expended substantial funds arbitrating the case.85  Another 
court has explained that the AAA’s accounting department determines who is 
awarded “extreme hardship” status, but that the AAA does not provide formal 
standards for the department to follow.86  Just as there are no mandatory guide-
lines, there are also no publicly available statements of criteria that the AAA 
might use, and at least some of the persons evaluating requests for waivers 
receive no training on how to handle the requests.87 
It may be that the costs of arbitration are sometimes lowered by the infor-
mal, customary practices of arbitrators.  For instance, in one case, the business 
respondent contended that it is customary for AAA arbitrators to serve the first 
day for no compensation, in effect waiving their fees for that day and leaving 
the consumer to pay only the filing fee, at least initially.88  According to one 
study, prior to 1994 the AAA prohibited its arbitrators from charging for the 
first day they served, but the AAA has since dropped this requirement.89  But 
even if such a customary practice was widely followed, there is no guarantee 
that a dispute will require only one hearing or that a particular arbitrator will 
follow the custom.  Furthermore, even if the hearing took only one day, and the 
arbitrator adhered to the custom, the consumer would still have to pay the arbi-
trator for preparation time. 
This review of the waiver rules of the NAF and the AAA demonstrates that 
consumers cannot depend upon the arbitration service providers to provide 
access to arbitration to persons who cannot afford it.  Even very poor consum-
ers must be prepared to challenge the cost of arbitration.  Moreover, the AAA 
and NAF rules on fee waivers can always be tightened or eliminated at the will 
of these organizations.  The courts’ fee-waiver provisions, by contrast, are 
embodied in statutes and court rules not subject to the whims of a private com-
pany.90 
 
 85. Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 606 (Wash. App. Div. 2002).  The parties 
stipulated that waivers are “extremely rare” in Camacho v. Holiday Homes, 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 
(W.D. Va. 2001). 
 86. Camacho, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 897. 
 87. Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at  917 (showing that the last two individuals responsible for evaluating 
fee waiver requests had received no training on how to evaluate these requests). 
 88. State ex rel Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 281 n.13 (W. Va. 2002). 
 89. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 14, at 71; see id. at 61, 70 & 75.  The AAA 
website states that the AAA has over three thousand arbitrators who have volunteered to “serve pro 
bono” when an individual is financially unable to pursue rights through arbitration.  See AAA WAIVER 
RULES, supra note 78.  No information is provided as to how the AAA determines whether an individ-
ual qualifies for this benefit, how many volunteer arbitrators have the expertise needed to decide con-
sumer cases, or where these arbitrators live.  Thus, it is unknown whether pro bono arbitrators are 
widely available. 
 90. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 563.01 (1999); ARIZ. CODE JUDICIAL 
ADMIN. § 5-206 (2002); ALASKA R. ADMIN. 10; ME. R. CIV. PRO. 91; JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 
INFORMATION SHEET ON WAIVER OF COURT FEES AND COSTS (revised Mar. 21, 2003), at 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/documents/982a17a.pdf. 
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D. Business Subsidization 
A form of de facto fee waiver, not specifically discussed in the services’ rules 
but having the same effect, occurs when the business offers to pay all or some of 
the costs of arbitration once the consumer or employee has filed a lawsuit chal-
lenging the arbitration agreement.  Courts are divided on how to deal with 
these offers.  Some hold that if the business makes such an offer, the consumer 
or employee no longer has a valid argument against compelled arbitration 
based on costs.91  A few others apply the terms of the contract to decide the 
issue.  Some arbitration contracts, for example, contain a provision that any 
modification must be in writing and signed by the parties.  Some courts treat an 
offer to pay all costs as an offer to modify the arbitration agreement; unless the 
consumer or employee has agreed in writing to the business’s offer, it cannot 
affect a finding that the costs are prohibitive. 92 
Other courts have correctly recognized the policy implications of permitting 
companies to “cleanse” the taint of invalid provisions imposing high costs by 
offering to pay a particular plaintiff’s costs.  In at least three cases under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act,93 courts have refused to sever an impermissible pro-
vision of an arbitration agreement because doing so would encourage employ-
ers to include these provisions in their agreements.94  Some employees would be 
deterred from bringing cases because they could not afford the fees.  Those who 
decided to challenge the fees would have to file lawsuits seeking a court order 
invalidating the cost provisions.  This creates an impermissible disincentive for 
persons to seek to vindicate their statutory rights.95  As one court held, “If 
[d]efendants could sever invalid provisions from their contracts, [this] would 
create an incentive for employers to craft questionable arbitration agreements, 
require plaintiffs to jump through hoops in order to invalidate those agree-
 
 91. See Arellano v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 01 C 2433, 2002 WL 221604, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 
2002) (stating that since the corporation offered to pay all costs, the plaintiff can no longer dispute an 
arbitration agreement based on prohibitive costs); Dumais v. Golf Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190 
(D.N.M. 2001) (discussing the plaintiff’s failure to show that costs would be prohibitive in light of the 
defendant’s offer to pay); Roberson v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 
2001) (stating that the defendant’s evidence that it would pay the arbitration costs renders the plaintiff’s 
claim of prohibitive cost meritless). 
 92. See Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1284 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated on 
stipulation, 294 F.3d 1275 (2002); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002 
WL 100391, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 23 2002) (mem.) (holding parties are only bound by contract modifica-
tions to which they have both assented in a signed, written confirmation), rev’d 346 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 
2003); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 681 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the “pur-
ported modification fails to cure the defect caused by imposing arbitration fees on the employee”); 
Flyer Printing Co. v. Hill, 805 So. 2d 829, 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to discuss whether 
the contract prohibited oral modifications, but refusing to “remake the parties’ contract” after the 
employee rejected the employer’s offer to pay all the costs); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 
265, 268 (W. Va. 2002). 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000). 
 94. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 676-77 (6th Cir. 2003); Perez, 253 F.3d at 
1287; Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 782 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
 95. See Cooper, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 782. 
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ments, and ultimately allow the defendants to jettison questionable provisions 
from the arbitration agreements.”96 
E. Agreement Terms Affecting Costs 
Beyond the fee schedules of the arbitration service providers, the terms of 
arbitration agreements also contribute to the costs of arbitration, potentially 
making it financially infeasible for consumers.  Among the terms that increase 
the cost of arbitration, and have thereby come under the scrutiny of the courts, 
are provisions limiting remedies, prohibiting class actions, or requiring that 
hearings take place in a particular, inconvenient location.97  While accounting 
for these restrictions creates a more realistic assessment of arbitration costs, 
there is no consistency among the courts as to whether these costs will be con-
sidered in determining the financial feasibility of arbitration.98  Consequently, 
consumers have no assurance of when or how these factors will be included in a 
court’s determination of costs. 
One factor affecting the costs of arbitration is the recovery that is available 
should a claim be successful.  Many arbitration agreements provide that the 
arbitrator may not award consequential or punitive damages, severely restrict-
ing the consumer’s total recovery.  Some courts consider the damages an arbi-
trator is authorized to award when gauging the financial feasibility of submitting 
a claim in arbitration,99 and some have refused to enforce limitations-of-reme-
dies provisions on the basis of unconscionablility.100 
Another factor that the courts have considered is whether the economics of 
the case provide sufficient incentives for a lawyer to agree to represent the con-
sumer in arbitration.101  A lawyer is necessary if the consumer’s success depends 
on making legal arguments and engaging in sophisticated discovery.  It is in this 
context that some courts have found provisions prohibiting class actions uncon-
scionable because lawyers may find it financially infeasible to handle small, dis-
crete claims with limited recovery unless those claims can be joined.102  If an 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 918; Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731-33 (Ala. 2002) (criticiz-
ing limitations on remedies); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566-67 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (criticizing requirements that hearings be held in inconvenient locations); Dunlap, 567 
S.E.2d at 277 (criticizing class action prohibitions). 
 98. See infra Part III. 
 99. See, e.g., Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (discussing the prohibitive quality of limitations on attor-
neys’ fees and damages recovery). 
 100. See, e.g., Thicklin, 182 So. 2d at 731-33 (holding that prohibiting punitive damages is against 
public policy and substantively unconscionable); Dunlap, 567 S.E.2d at 277 (holding that prohibiting 
punitive damages is unconscionable). 
 101. See, e.g., Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (noting that limitations on damages can make litigating or 
arbitrating a particular claim infeasible). 
 102. See Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 919; Dunlap, 567 S.E.2d at 277 (holding that prohibiting class 
action relief is unconscionable); see also Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class 
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 81 (2000) (“Most consumer claims 
require sufficient legal and factual analysis, so that persons could not fully expect to represent them-
selves, and few lawyers would be willing to take a very small case based only on the possible recovery 
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arbitration agreement restricts damages and forbids class actions, a “lawyer 
would almost certainly incur more in costs and time charges just getting the 
complaint prepared, filed[,] and served than she would recover, even if the case 
were ultimately successful . . . .  The net result is that cases . . . will not be prose-
cuted even if meritorious.”103 
Neither JAMS’s nor the NAF’s rules directly address the issue of class 
actions.104  The failure of the arbitration services to do so means that whether 
class arbitration will be permitted is left largely to contract law.  The Supreme 
Court has not directly decided this issue,105 and most courts have held that class 
arbitration is permitted only if the agreement specifically allows it.106  While 
several of the agreements in the Survey specifically prohibited consolidation 
and class actions, none expressly permitted them.107 
Another factor the courts have considered as affecting the costs of arbitra-
tion is the location of the hearing. 108  Many consumer arbitration agreements 
stipulate that any hearing will to take place in a particular city or geographic 
area, causing consumers to bear burdensome and disproportionate outlays of 
 
of some attorney fees and costs.”).  Contra Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to find a class action prohibition unconscionable). 
 103. Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 919  (noting that the costs in the case would be so high, and damages 
and remedies so limited, that even “desk arbitration” (arbitration decided on documents alone), would 
not be feasible).  The Ting court also noted that legal aid programs lack the resources to take these 
cases.  Id. 
 104. The AAA has recently adopted procedures for class arbitration.  It “will administer demands 
for class arbitration . . . if (1) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties’ 
agreement shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the Association’s rules, and (2) the 
agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims.”  AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION POLICY ON CLASS ARBITRATION, at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\ 
Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\Topics_Interest\Class%20Action.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2003).  It will not administer class arbitration if the underlying agreement prohibits class claims, con-
solidation, or joinder unless a class suit is directed to arbitration under court order.  Id. 
 105. The closest the Court has come to the issue was in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. 
Ct. 2402 (2003), in which the court held that when an arbitration agreement does not clearly prohibit 
class arbitration, the arbitrator and not the court should determine whether the contract bars class arbi-
tration. 
 106. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the lower 
court’s refusal to certify a claim when the agreement was silent on issue of class arbitration); Gov’t of 
U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that “[a] district court cannot consolidate 
arbitration proceedings arising from separate agreements to arbitrate, absent the parties’ agreement to 
allow such consolidation”); Am. Centennial Ins. v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that “a district court is without power to consolidate arbitration proceedings, over the objec-
tion of a party to the arbitration agreement, when the agreement is silent regarding consolidation”). 
 107. See Survey, supra note 4. 
 108. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that a contract stating that arbitration will be conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is uncon-
scionable and unenforceable when the transaction occurred in San Francisco, California, and consum-
ers were unsophisticated borrowers with small claims); see also NAF CODE, supra note 23, at 23 (pro-
viding that any in-person participatory hearing will be held where the arbitration agreement designates, 
if there is such a designation); F. PAUL BLAND, JR., ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
52 (2d ed. 2002) (detailing the NAF rules on such clauses). 
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money and time.109  Arbitrating in a far-away place may contribute to costs far in 
excess of what would be incurred in a judicial proceeding. 
III 
CHALLENGING ARBITRATION COSTS 
Consumers face many obstacles in challenging arbitration costs.  For con-
sumers who cannot afford arbitration, the only meaningful time to raise a chal-
lenge is before the arbitration has commenced.  It is difficult, however, to esti-
mate what the costs will be before the fact.  Many agreements do not designate 
an arbitration service provider, so there is no way to know what fee schedule 
will apply.  Even when an agreement names a provider and that provider pub-
lishes a fee schedule, those schedules frequently change.  Further, arbitration 
costs depend upon a number of factors in addition to service-provider fees, fac-
tors that often cannot be estimated in advance.  Finally, the courts have not 
adopted a uniform approach regarding which factors to include in determining 
whether costs are sufficiently high for consumers to prevail in their challenges.  
Because of these obstacles, consumers who cannot afford arbitration are often 
unable to raise successful challenges.  As a result, they are denied access to a 
forum for resolving their disputes, a situation that undermines the integrity of 
the dispute-resolution process. 
A. Obstacles to Determining the Costs of Arbitration 
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,110 the Supreme Court declared 
that  a consumer seeking to “invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground 
that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive . . . bears the burden of 
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”111  The Court failed, however, to 
provide any guidelines for determining what would constitute prohibitive 
expense, specifically refusing to indicate “[h]ow detailed the showing of prohibi-
tive expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must come forward 
with contrary evidence.”112 
Another issue the Supreme Court left unclear is when a consumer is permit-
ted to bring a challenge based on the cost of arbitration.  Several courts have 
permitted consumers to mount a challenge before arbitration occurs based on 
estimates of the likely cost,113 but at least one court has refused to do so.114  
 
 109. Survey, supra note 4.  For example, the Lending Tree contract provides that the hearing will be 
in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.  The PayPal hearing will be in Santa Clara, California, the 
Amazon hearing in Seattle, Washington, and the eBay hearing in San Jose, California. 
 110. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 111. Id. at 92. 
 112.. Id. 
 113. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003); Phillips v. Assocs. 
Home Equity Serv., Inc, 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Lelouis v. W. Directory Co., 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 1214, 1224 (D. Or. 2001) (“While the precise cost may not be known (and often cannot be 
known until after the arbitration), this court could make a reasoned estimate of the probable arbitra-
tion costs based upon its knowledge of the relevant legal community and of arbitration practices in 
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Either way, consumers face considerable difficulty.  If the latter case is fol-
lowed, consumers would be forced to make an unacceptable choice. Costs can 
be too high for two principal reasons: because the consumer simply cannot 
afford to pay the necessary fees and other expenses, or because those expenses 
would be far greater than any possible benefit from bringing the claim.115  If a 
consumer cannot afford to arbitrate but must wait until arbitration is completed 
to bring a challenge, she will have to abandon her claim altogether.  If the con-
sumer can afford the expense, but it is greater than the damages she could col-
lect if she won, she has to take the substantial risk of incurring the costs anyway 
and hoping she can then persuade a court to invalidate the arbitration clause, 
after spending an additional sum on litigation. 
If consumers are allowed to bring a challenge prior to arbitration, they must 
somehow estimate its costs.  Yet, these costs are often impossible to determine 
in advance because of the common terms of arbitration agreements and the 
many variables that go into the fees of the arbitration service providers. Arbi-
tration agreements themselves typically provide little or no information about 
costs.116  Some do not even designate a service provider or the rules that will 
govern, making it impossible to determine what the costs of arbitration would 
be.117  And while many agreements provide that the arbitration will be governed 
by the rules of a named provider, some do not require that the provider be the 
one whose rules are designated.118  This distinction is significant,119 for at least 
 
general.”); Giordano v. Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. 99-1281, 2001 WL 484360, at *6 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2001) (holding that although the employee could not precisely establish the amount 
of the arbitrator’s fee, based on the employee’s income and the initial filing fee, the costs impeded the 
employee’s ability to vindicate his rights); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 605 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to force the plaintiff to spend $2,000 arbitrating a $1,500 dispute before 
challenging the fees). 
 114. See In re First Merit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001). 
 115. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that 
the arbitration service imposed a $4,999 fee, $2,000 of which was non-refundable, when the plaintiff 
class members sought only around $1,000 in damages per consumer). 
 116. Fifteen of the thirty-one agreements in the Survey said nothing about costs.  See Survey, supra 
note 4.  The remainder gave minimal information about costs, stating only that the fees would be split.  
Cf. Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that the agree-
ment was vague with regard to cost); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 271 (W. Va. 2002) 
(pointing out that nothing in the agreement would enable the consumer to project arbitration costs). 
 117. Cf. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90 n.6 (noting that the failure of the arbitration clause at issue to 
designate a service provider meant that the plaintiff’s claim that the costs of arbitrating her claim would 
be prohibitively high was based solely on “unfounded assumptions”); Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 
211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that Household International’s agreement pro-
vided that the parties would select the rules when a claim was filed). 
 118. In the Survey, thirty out of the thirty-one agreements collected state that the arbitration will be 
governed by the rules of a named provider.  Nineteen of those state that the provider will administer 
the arbitration.  The remaining eleven are silent on who will administer the arbitration.  In that situa-
tion, the arbitration may be administered by the named provider or by some other organization, pre-
sumably one chosen by the business.  If a different organization administers the arbitration, there is less 
assurance that the rules will be known and followed, and little institutional interest in making sure they 
are.  The rules on fees are quite complex, with the applicable fees depending on several factors.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to be concerned that an entity other than the named provider will not know 
or follow the rules.  In addition, as discussed below, the providers change their rules from time to time, 
and agreements addressing the issue provide that the applicable rules are those in effect at the time the 
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one court has rejected a consumer’s challenge when the agreement designated a 
particular provider’s rules but did not require that the provider administer the 
arbitration.120  The court pointed out that under such circumstances, the con-
sumer could provide “no evidence that the [provider] would actually conduct 
the arbitration or charge the specified fees.”121 
Moreover, even if it is perfectly clear what fee schedule will apply, it is still 
difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer to estimate the cost of arbitrating a 
claim.  The consumer must first find and untangle the provider’s rules and their 
fee provisions.  Then the consumer has to engage in a lengthy and complex 
investigation to determine what the fees might be because provider fees are 
generally contingent upon a host of variables, including, most importantly, the 
size of the claim.122  She has to estimate the amount of damages she has suffered 
and then determine what, if any, amounts in addition to actual damages are 
considered part of the claim for purposes of determining the fees that will be 
assessed.123  She has to distinguish between filing fees, administrative fees, and 
arbitrator fees.  Then, at least under the NAF’s rules, the consumer has to guess 
as to all sorts of contingencies that often cannot reasonably be known until arbi-
tration begins: the type and number of hearings she will need; whether she will 
need to request a subpoena, a discovery order, or another type of order; and 
whether she will want a written disposition.124  If the consumer wants an in-
person hearing, transportation costs may also be an important factor.  Under 
the NAF’s rules, in-person hearings are held where the respondent resides or 
does business unless the arbitration agreement designates another location or 
the parties agree otherwise.125  In the Survey conducted for this Article, some 
agreements specify that the hearing will be heard in only one location, which 
may be far from where the consumer resides, requiring substantial transporta-
 
arbitration commences.  It is less likely that an entity other than the named provider will keep abreast 
of these changes.  See Survey, supra note 4. 
An additional difficulty in proving costs is presented by arbitration agreements that provide con-
sumers the choice of two or more providers.  The agreements of Sam’s Club, Sears, Discover, and 
Chase Manhattan fit this description.  Id.  When challenging such clauses, consumers will presumably 
have to prove that the costs would be too high under each provider the consumer might choose. 
 119. Justice Ginsburg may have failed to appreciate this distinction in her dissent in Randolph.  She 
suggested that Green Tree could have provided that the arbitration “would be governed by” the 
AAA’s rules and that this would have made the cost determination easier.  Randolph, 531 U.S. at 95 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  But this overlooks the possibility that the arbitration might be governed by 
the AAA’s rules but not administered by the AAA.  Id. 
 120. See In re First Merit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001); accord Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 
1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting challenge because, although the agreement required arbitration 
under the AAA’s rules, it also provided that the AAA would not administer the arbitration unless both 
parties agreed). 
 121. First Merit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 757. 
 122. See supra Part II.A. 
 123. See supra note 27 (distinguishing between the ways in which the AAA and the NAF determine 
the operative size of the claims involved). 
 124. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 125. NAF Code, supra note 23, at 23.  Rule 32(A) is the default rule that applies unless the agree-
ment designates a location or the parties agree upon one. 
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tion expenses.126  Certain costs simply cannot be estimated in advance.  For 
example, under the AAA rules, if the claim is over $75,000, the consumer will 
not be able to estimate the arbitrator’s fees until the arbitrator is selected,127 and 
the business can force additional expenses on the consumer by filing a summary 
judgment motion or refusing discovery requests and thereby increasing the time 
the arbitrator spends resolving the claim.128 
Finally, the arbitration providers frequently change their rules, causing addi-
tional uncertainty.129  Those agreements that address the issue of what version of 
a provider’s rules will apply designate those in effect when the claim is filed or 
when the arbitration commences.130  Other agreements are silent on this point, 
leaving open the issue of whether the applicable rules are those in effect when 
the agreement is entered into, when the dispute arises, when the claim is filed, 
or when the arbitration proceedings begin.  Under such an agreement, unless 
the parties agree, the question will have to be brought to a court or an 
arbitrator.  Even when the agreement specifies that the rules in effect when the 
arbitration commences apply, the consumer will not know what those rules say 
about costs until the arbitration does in fact commence because the rules could 
change at any time, and the case cannot commence until the consumer pays at 
least part of the fee to which he is objecting.131 
The arbitration service providers have attempted to address the issue of rule 
revisions, but it is doubtful that their attempts put the issue to rest.  The AAA 
provides that “[t]he AAA’s most current rules will be used when the arbitration 
is started.”132  The NAF specifies that the governing rules will be those in effect 
at the time the claim is filed, unless the parties or the applicable law direct oth-
erwise.133  JAMS designates the “[r]ules in effect on the date of the commence-
ment of the [a]rbitration, . . . unless the [p]arties have specified another ver-
sion,” defining “commencement of the arbitration” in excruciating detail.134  The 
AAA’s approach raises two questions: First, does the arbitration “start” when 
the claim is filed or when the hearing is held?  Second, how should a court rule 
when the arbitration agreement provides that the dispute will be arbitrated by 
the AAA and under the AAA’s rules, but also provides that a set of rules other 
 
 126. See supra note 109. 
 127. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 128. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 14, 55. 
 129. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, RULES AND PROCEDURES; ARCHIVES, at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15708 (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (listing outdated rules of the 
AAA); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Arbitration Association at 20, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph,  531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235), available at 2000 WL 744161 (explaining that under the 
AAA’s Consumer Rules, “[r]ules, forms, procedures and guides are subject to periodic change and 
updating”); AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 6 (same). 
 130. See, e.g., Survey, supra note 4; Hale v. First USA Bank, No. 00CIV5406JGK, 2001 WL 687371 
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2001); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002).  The agree-
ments of Chase Manhattan, DirecTV, Discover, Sears, Sam’s Club, and Sprint are examples. 
 131. See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 6, at C-8; NAF CODE, supra note 23, at 31. 
 132. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 6, at C-1(a). 
 133. See NAF CODE, supra note 23, at 1, R. 1(C). 
 134. JAMS RULES, supra note 52, at R. 3, 5. 
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than the “most current . . . when the arbitration is started” apply?  Both the 
AAA’s and JAMS’s attempts to address the issue raise the problem addressed 
earlier that a consumer still might not be able to determine which rules apply 
because the rules could change at the last moment. 
Despite these obstacles to determining the costs of arbitration before the 
fact, consumers have prevailed in several reported cases.135  However, winning 
may require substantial expertise and resources.  For example, the consumer 
attorneys in Ting v. AT&T 136 were experienced and skilled lawyers, with the 
resources needed to mount a sophisticated attack that included not only 
engaging in extensive discovery137 but also commissioning their own survey.138  
The businesses defending consumer arbitration generally have substantial 
resources and are represented by lawyers who have participated in many cases 
and have developed their own expertise.139 
B. Conflict in the Courts 
In addition to the obstacles consumers encounter in estimating the costs of 
arbitration, the courts are conflicted over what considerations count in deter-
mining whether arbitration costs are prohibitively high.  In Randoph, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]t may well be that the existence of large 
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her 
federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”140  Courts are split over what type 
of showing is required to prove that costs are so high as to bar access to justice.  
Interpretations of what Green Tree requires focus on three factors: the financial 
condition of the claimant, the absolute cost of arbitration, and the relative cost 
of arbitration when compared to court proceedings.  Some courts focus on the 
financial condition of the plaintiff, requiring her to prove that, under the facts of 
the particular dispute, she cannot afford to proceed on her claim.  Other courts 
consider the costs of the particular arbitration coupled with the plaintiff’s finan-
 
 135. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 
319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 136. 182 F. Supp. 2d at  902. 
 137. See Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 57, at 87-88.  The Ting plaintiffs were represented by a 
sophisticated consumer advocate and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, a “national public interest law 
firm.”  See Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, at http://www.tlpj.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).  The plain-
tiffs’ attorneys were also counsel in other major arbitration cases.  See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. 
Health Psycare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Sobremonte v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43 
(Ct. App. 1998); Badie v. Bank of Am., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Ct. App. 1998); Patterson v. ITT Con-
sumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 138. Ting, 182 F. Supp. At 912. 
 139. One notes, for example, the repeated presence of certain defendants in disputes over arbitra-
tion.  See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 1999); Munoz v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360 (S.C. 2001). 
 140. 531 U.S. at 90 (refusing to conclude that the costs of arbitration precluded the vindication of 
the plaintiff’s statutory rights because the record contained no evidence of the costs the consumer 
would incur). 
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cial situation.141  Still others compare the costs of proceeding to arbitration with 
the costs of litigating the same claim. 
Some courts focus on the individual plaintiff’s impoverished financial condi-
tion,142 rejecting the challenge if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that she cannot 
afford the costs of arbitration.  These courts have not established uniform 
standards for determining whether arbitration is too expensive relative to a 
consumer’s resources, instead relying on a case-by-case determination of 
whether the consumer is unable to pay.143  This makes it impossible for either 
consumers or businesses to predict who might be able to make the requisite 
showing and encourages litigation of the issue, a result that conflicts with the 
goal of judicial efficiency. 
Other courts focus on the costs of arbitration relative to litigation, inter-
preting Randolph to require a showing of “the likelihood that [the plaintiff] will 
be responsible for significant arbitrators’ fees[] or other costs [that] would not 
be incurred in a judicial forum.”144  This standard is much less subjective and 
more predictable than a case-by-case examination of each consumer’s ability to 
afford arbitration.  As an initial matter, the court can simply compare court 
filing fees with the arbitration minimums.  Often, this simple comparison will be 
sufficient to conclude that arbitration poses cost barriers substantially greater 
than those imposed by a court.  For example, the filing fee for a civil case in a 
U.S. district court is $150.145  For claims over $75,000, the NAF’s and the AAA’s 
 
 141. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that courts should consider whether arbitration fees are prohibitively expensive); Cooper v. 
MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 781 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (explaining that the consumer need only 
prove the costs would be too high for her). 
 142. See, e.g., Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(finding costs prohibitive in light of the AAA’s arbitrators fees, the subprime nature of the claimant’s 
mortgage, and her affidavit showing that she was in financial distress and unable to pay the costs); 
Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 597 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (addressing the plaintiff’s 
educational attainment, employment situation, and family size to show his inability to pay arbitration 
costs). 
 143. Phillips, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (relying on an affidavit of the consumer alleging her inability to 
pay); Mendez, 45 P.3d at 603 (“[T]he cost of arbitration is so high relative to [the plaintiff’s] financial 
condition and the small size of his primary claim ($1,500) that forcing AAA arbitration with three arbi-
trators effectively precludes him from pursuing his claims.”). 
 144. Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Bailey v. Ameri-
quest Mortgage Co., No. Civ. 01-545, 2002 WL 100391, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan 23, 2002) (mem.) (“The 
arbitration agreement . . . requires plaintiffs to incur fees and costs in pursuit of their statutory rights 
[under the Fair Labor Standards Act] that they would not otherwise incur in a judicial forum.”); 
Phillips, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (considering both the consumer’s poverty and the fact that arbitration 
likely would cost at least twelve times more than filing a case in federal court); Giordano v. Pep Boys—
Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc, No. 99-1281, 2001 WL 484360, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2001) (stating that 
the Supreme Court in Randolph “seemed to focus on the absence of information about the costs of 
arbitration rather than on any absence of information about Randolph’s personal finances”). 
 145. See U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, Current Fees & Charges (effective Jan. 1, 
2004), at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/court_fees.htm; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, Clerks Office Fees (effective Nov. 1, 2003), at http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/formsandfees/ 
schedule.htm; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, U.S. District Court Fees, at 
http://www.are.uscourts.gov/fees.htm (last visited July 7, 2003); U.S. District Court for the District of 
Nebraska, Court Fees, at http://www.ned.uscourts.gov/info/fees.html (last visited July 7, 2003). 
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fees are many hundreds of dollars higher.  Fees in many state courts also are far 
less than the NAF and AAA fees for large claims.146 
The minimum fees of the arbitration service providers are closer to court 
fees for smaller claims, but consumers can, of course, incur expenses in arbitra-
tion well beyond the minimum fees.  A fair comparison would consider the 
likelihood that the consumer will incur additional fees under the fee schedule of 
the arbitration provider or under provisions in the arbitration agreement limit-
ing damages, prohibiting class actions, or designating an inconvenient venue.  
Even the cost of JAMS arbitration might be substantial when these provisions 
are considered. 
Comparing arbitration costs to court costs is far more efficient than exam-
ining each consumer’s ability to pay.  Nevertheless, this approach is not a pana-
cea.  It remains unanswered how great the cost difference must be to justify 
invalidating the arbitration agreement.  Additionally, in determining what the 
cost of arbitration would be, it is not yet clear what expenses courts will include,  
beyond the minimum provider fees. 
C.  What the Conflicts and Difficulties Mask 
Despite the difficulties of proving the costs of arbitration in individual cases, 
it is clear that the costs of arbitration are sufficiently high to deny many con-
sumers access to justice.  Indigent consumers with claims exceeding the jurisdic-
tion of small claims court are forced into arbitration subject to vague, discre-
tionary rules regarding fee waivers and deferrals.  Consumers who can afford 
the higher costs of arbitrating smaller claims are dissuaded from doing so 
because those costs may make it financially infeasible to bring the claim, given 
the small amount that may be recoverable.  For large claims, the cost of arbitra-
tion is at least several hundred dollars in filing fees alone if the arbitration is 
administered by the AAA or the NAF, far more than many consumers can 
afford and substantially more than court fees.  The consumers most likely to be 
barred by these costs—consumers of modest means—are also the ones who 
most need access to a dispute-resolution forum and who are the most damaged 
by any out-of-pocket losses they might have suffered as a result of a business’s 
conduct. 
 
 146. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that the fees 
charged by arbitration services can be up to 5,000% higher than court fees).  In Massachusetts, the cost 
of filing a complaint in district court is $150.  MASS. GEN. LAWS  ANN. ch.262 §2 (2003).  Filing a com-
plaint in superior court costs $200.  Id. § 4A.  In the district courts of Alaska (amount claimed is under 
$50,000), the fee for filing a complaint is $60.  Filing a complaint in superior court (amount claimed is 
$50,000 or more) costs $10.  See http://www.state.ak.us/courts/adm.htm (last visited July 7, 2003).  In 
Connecticut, the fee is $125 for a claim of less than $2,500 and $225 if the amount is $2,500 or more.  
See http://www.jud.state.ct.us/external/super/courtfee.htm (last visited July 7, 2003). 
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IV 
INSUFFICIENT LEGAL THEORIES 
Whether courts employ a standard that focuses on the individual consumer’s 
financial situation, her ability to pay for a particular arbitration, or a compari-
son of the costs of arbitration to those of a judicial proceeding, a court cannot 
simply conclude that the costs are too high and invalidate an arbitration agree-
ment.  Instead, some legal theory must apply allowing the court to conclude that 
high cost can justify invalidating the agreement.  The courts have used two legal 
theories to strike down arbitration agreements or their terms based on cost.  
When the claimant raises and the agreement purports to cover statutory claims, 
the courts have asked whether the costs of arbitration impermissibly preclude 
the plaintiff from vindicating her statutory rights.  In statutory and other cases, 
the courts have asked whether the costs make the agreement or parts thereof 
unconscionable.  Significant deficiencies plague both theories. 
The Supreme Court applied the vindication-of-statutory-rights theory to the 
issue of consumer arbitration cost in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.147  
The case involved the purchase of a mobile home on credit and the consumer’s 
allegation that the creditors violated two federal statutes.148  The arbitration 
agreement between the parties required the consumer to submit all disputes to 
binding arbitration but did not designate any arbitration service to administer 
the case.149 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the agreement was unenforceable “because it 
fails to provide the minimum guarantees required to ensure that Randolph’s 
ability to vindicate her statutory rights will not be undone by steep filing fees, 
steep arbitrators’ fees, or other high costs of arbitration.”150  The court was also 
disturbed by other aspects of the agreement: its failure to provide for waiver of 
fees when the costs would impose a financial hardship, its failure to address the 
possibility that the consumer’s costs might exceed the arbitrator’s award even if 
she prevailed, and its failure to indicate whether established rules would govern 
or whether the parties were to negotiate their own rules.151  The agreement’s 
silence on these points made it invalid. 
The Eleventh Circuit clearly viewed the consumer’s ability to vindicate her 
federal statutory rights as a paramount value and treated the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act’s general validation of arbitration152 within that frame of reference.  
Therefore, the court put the onus on the drafter of the agreement to write a 
contract including “guarantees” that the consumer can exercise her rights.  For 
example, the court was bothered that the agreement “provides no guarantee 
 
 147. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 83. 
 150. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
BUDNITZ.DOC 10/14/2004  10:15 AM 
158 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:133 
that a consumer successfully arbitrating under this clause will not be saddled 
with a prohibitive costs order.”153  The court also understood the financial reali-
ties of litigating many consumer cases, referring to the “small sum that is likely 
to be the object of the dispute in arbitrations of this kind”154 as well as the likeli-
hood that the consumer would have a modest income.155 
The Supreme Court reversed.  On its simplest level, the case can be boiled 
down to four sentences. 
It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant 
such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbi-
tral forum.  But the record does not show that Randolph will bear such costs if she 
goes to arbitration.  Indeed, it contains hardly any information on the matter . . . .  The 
record reveals only the arbitration agreement’s silence on the subject, and that fact 
alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable.156 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,157 the Court held 
that one party can force another to pursue a statutory claim in arbitration “so 
long as the litigant effectively may vindicate the statutory cause of action in the 
arbitral forum.”158  In Randolph, the Court made it clear that the converse also 
applies: A party can successfully challenge an arbitration agreement on the 
basis that she cannot effectively vindicate her statutory rights.  Furthermore, 
excessive cost is one basis for such a challenge.159  The Court reversed the Elev-
enth Circuit’s decision for two reasons.  First, neither the agreement nor the 
record gave any indication of what the costs would be.  Second, the Court ruled 
that the person who challenges an arbitration agreement based on cost bears 
the burden of proof.160 
The advantage of applying the vindication-of-statutory-rights theory to cases 
challenging the cost of consumer arbitration is its clear authorization by the 
Supreme Court.  The disadvantages, however, may outweigh the advantages.  
For example, it is unclear what the consumer has to prove, which the Court 
purposely avoided answering.161  At one point, the Court stated that “large” 
costs can support a challenge.162  Later in the opinion, the Court spoke of a liti-
gant seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the basis that it would be 
“prohibitively expensive.”163  “Large” and “prohibitively expensive” are terms 
that convey a similar meaning, but they are far from synonymous.  As a result, it 
is unclear what the Court intended. 
 
 153. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Green Tree Fin. Corp v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
 157. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 158. Id. at 637. 
 159. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90. 
 160. Id. at 92. 
 161. Id. at 90. 
 162. Id. at 92. 
 163. Id. 
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In addition, the Court failed to say whether courts should examine in each 
case whether the individual plaintiff can afford arbitration as it is proposed, or 
should instead compare the likely arbitration costs to court costs.  Although the 
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, it did not expressly criticize the lower 
court’s approach of looking at all aspects of the arbitration agreement that 
might bear upon costs and the financial realities of litigating consumer cases.  
Finally, the vindication theory is too narrow to be applicable in some cases.  It 
applies only when the consumer’s claim is based on statutory rights, not when it 
is based on nonstatutory rights, such as common law contract or tort duties. 
Several courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability to strike down 
consumer arbitration agreements.  Courts have considered several aspects of 
arbitration costs in doing so.  Some courts compare the cost of arbitration to the 
cost of litigation.164  One court not only made that comparison but also consid-
ered the consumer’s financial condition and the small amount of the claim.165  
Another relevant factor is whether the arbitrator’s fee is so high that it would 
be prohibitively expensive to bring small claims in arbitration.166  Some courts 
also take into account limitation-of-damages provisions in the agreement.167 
The doctrine of unconscionability presents several advantages over the vin-
dication-of-statutory-rights approach.  Unlike the vindication theory, uncon-
scionability is not confined to claims asserting statutory rights.  In addition, 
innumerable cases define and apply the unconscionability doctrine in other 
contexts.  Consequently, it is not as vague as the vindication theory, and courts 
can find guidance in its application by examining prior decisions. 
Nevertheless, a consumer’s ability to succeed on an unconscionability claim 
is severely limited.  Case law puts the burden of proving unconscionability on 
the consumer168—a substantial burden because neither statutes nor cases pre-
cisely define “unconscionability.”169  In most states, the consumer must show 
 
 164. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the scheme to be uncon-
scionable “because it imposes on some consumers costs greater than those a complainant would bear if 
he or she would file the same complaint in court”); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,  54 P.3d 1, 16 
(Mont. 2002) (comparing the costs of arbitration with those associated with resolution through the 
courts); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 602 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (describing dis-
parity of costs as relevant to the question of unconscionability). 
 165. See Mendez, 45 P.3d at 603 (determining that a consumer’s financial condition and the size of 
her claim could be defenses to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement). 
 166. See, e.g., Kloss, 54 P.3d at 8 (listing the arbitrator’s fee as an example of the cost-prohibitive 
nature of some arbitration). 
 167. See, e.g., Thicklin v. Fantasy Mobile Homes, Inc., 824 So. 2d 723, 739 (Ala. 2002) (holding that 
contract provisions immunizing defendants from liability for punitive damages are invalid); Carll v. 
Terminex, Int’l Co., 793 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (finding unconscionability when the arbitrator 
lacked the power to award consequential damages for personal injuries); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 
567 S.E.2d 265, 275 (W. Va. 2002) (requiring exceptional circumstances to hold a provision limiting 
recovery enforceable). 
 168. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 211 (4th ed. 1995) 
(explaining that the burden of proof lies with the party bringing the claim). 
 169. Id. at 213 (“It is not possible to define unconscionability.  It is not a concept, but a determination 
to be made in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula.”). 
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both procedural and substantive unconscionability.170 Because a challenge to the 
costs of arbitration is substantive, the consumer must find other types of prob-
lems with the transaction to prove “procedural” unconscionability.  This second 
part of the unconscionability equation focuses on “the process of making the 
contract,”171 including “the age, education, intelligence, business acumen and 
experience of the parties, their relative bargaining power, the conspicuousness 
and comprehensibility of the contract . . . and the presence or absence of a 
meaningful choice.”172  The case law illustrates the difficulty consumers have had 
in persuading some courts to find procedural unconscionability in consumer 
arbitration cases.173 
Substantive unconscionability is often interpreted to mean that a term in the 
contract unfairly allocates risks or is not within the consumer’s reasonable 
expectations.174  Courts look at “the commercial reasonableness of the contract 
term, [and] the purpose and effect of the terms.”175  These are vague standards, 
and the courts have not provided needed specificity in the context of lawsuits 
based on the cost of arbitration.  Although a few courts have struck down arbi-
tration agreements on the basis of substantive unconscionability,176 others have 
refused to do so.177  In most jurisdictions no decisions provide satisfactory guid-
ance on how to apply substantive unconscionability to challenges to the cost of 
arbitration.  Courts might look to analogous cases in which a consumer has 
alleged that the price charged for goods or services is unconscionable, but the 
case law on price unconscionability is largely unhelpful because of its lack of 
uniformity as to what the consumer must prove.178 
Finally, the unconscionability doctrine is an inefficient tool for resolving the 
cost issue.  Proving both procedural and substantive unconscionability doctrine 
is fact intensive.  The courts list the factors to consider, but every holding 
depends heavily on the facts of the particular case.  Consequently, it is impossi-
 
 170. E.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1148; see also Milton Roberts, Annotation, Unconscionability, Under 
UCC § 2-302 or 2-719(3), of Disclaimer of Warranties or Limitation or Exclusion of Damages in Con-
tract Subject to UCC Article 2 (Sales), 38 A.L.R. 4th 25, 39 (1985). 
 171. See NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1996). 
 172. Id. at 772; see also Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149 (finding procedural unconscionability when the con-
sumer had no opportunity to negotiate, modify, or waive the terms of the arbitration agreement even 
though the consumer could have closed his account with the defendant and obtained service from a 
competitor). 
 173. See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 1999) (overturning the dis-
trict court’s holding of procedural unconscionability on the grounds that forced arbitration and denial 
of arbitrator choices are reasonable measures). 
 174. See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT 
SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 532 (1995). 
 175. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d at 772. 
 176. See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151 (finding that “substantively oppressive contract” terms warrant 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement). 
 177. See, e.g., In re RealNetworks, No. 00 C 1386, 2000 WL 631341, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) 
(refusing to find an agreement substantively unconscionable for precluding class actions); Hutchins, 
supra note 3, at 608-10 (discussing Alabama cases rejecting consumers’ unconscionability arguments). 
 178. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 168, at 218-23 (discussing the lack of uniformity among the 
courts regarding what constitutes unconscionability). 
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ble for the parties to accurately predict what a court might do.  This may 
encourage businesses to impose costly arbitration.  In addition, it may 
encourage litigation rather than settlement as each side hopes the vagueness of 
the doctrine will work to its advantage. 
The two theories courts use to determine whether to invalidate arbitration 
agreements based on excessive costs are unsatisfactory.  It remains unclear what 
factors must be proven, and even with a strong showing, the parties cannot pre-
dict with any certainty how a court might decide a challenge.  Lack of predict-
ability causes an inefficient use of judicial resources.  Since the courts employ 
unsatisfactory approaches, a legislative solution is preferable to continued reli-
ance on the courts. 
V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The costs of arbitration can be so high that they deny consumers access to a 
forum in which to air their disputes.  Costs can be excessive whether one con-
siders the consumer’s ability to pay, the absolute cost of arbitration, or the cost 
of arbitration compared to the cost of litigation.  The problem is only exacer-
bated by agreement terms restricting remedies, class actions, and venue that 
make the actual cost of arbitration greater than the direct fees charged.  Never-
theless, consumers face tremendous obstacles in proving that arbitration 
agreements should not be enforced because of those high costs.  These obstacles 
arise from several sources.  First, to avoid having to pay costs, the consumer 
must mount her challenge before the arbitration takes place, forcing her in 
many situations to estimate what the costs might be.  In addition, the rules and 
fee schedules of the arbitration service providers and the common terms of 
arbitration agreements often makes this estimation extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.  This is only made worse by the courts’ disagreement over what fac-
tors to consider in estimating the costs of arbitration and what standard to use 
in determining if those costs are too high.  Finally, the courts apply two differ-
ent legal theories to invalidate agreements based on cost, neither of which is 
satisfactory. 
These problems could be partially ameliorated by regulation or by prohib-
iting mandatory, predispute, binding arbitration.  Congress could, for example, 
create a regulatory scheme comparable to that which exists for securities arbi-
tration.179  Under this scheme, consumer arbitration agreements would be 
 
 179. See generally Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law 
in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1024-25 (2202) (explaining that investors who have 
disputes with their brokers are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements, but that the agreements 
are subject to the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the oversight of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission).  The NASD has established a subsidiary, the NASD Regu-
lation Office of Dispute Resolution, exclusively dedicated to handling disputes.  Id. at 991 n.5.  Addi-
tionally, the NASD has assembled panels of arbitrators in which a majority of the arbitrators cannot 
have had recent ties to the securities industry.  Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for 
Investors than the Courts? 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503, 1505 n.10, 1514 (1996).  The NASD has a formal 
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required to specify that one or more certified independent arbitration service 
providers would arbitrate any disputes pursuant to their rules.180  The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) would be required to establish an independent 
organization to certify and supervise providers and to issue regulations ensuring 
reasonable costs for consumer complainants.  The agency would require pro-
viders to clearly disclose all fees, including arbitrator compensation.  Providers 
would be certified if they complied with the FTC’s regulations and standards.  
The FTC would also require consumer arbitration agreements to clearly dis-
close the cost of arbitration.  Business subsidization would raise fewer conflicts-
of-interest concerns because of the regulatory oversight that would be present. 
The objections that would be raised to such regulation are predictable and 
not without a reasonable basis.  If possible, it is better to solve problems with-
out creating yet another government bureaucracy, with its inevitable inefficien-
cies, unintended consequences, and over-regulation.  At the same time, regula-
tion is not unreasonable given the current situation, so aptly described by Judge 
Nelson of the Montana Supreme Court, in which “[f]or their own obvious eco-
nomic benefit, large national and multi-national corporations are effectively 
privatizing an important segment of the civil justice system in this country by 
including fine-print, non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-it, mandatory, binding 
arbitration clauses in their standard-form contracts.”181 
A less bureaucratic solution would be for Congress to simply prohibit man-
datory, predispute, binding arbitration agreements in consumer transactions.182  
If consumers and businesses wanted to arbitrate once a dispute arose, they 
could always execute an agreement at that time.  This approach would not 
resolve all the problems consumers face in attempting to determine the actual 
 
training program and publishes guidance materials for arbitrators.  Black & Gross, supra, at 1027-28.  
Arbitral awards are published on-line. See http://www.nasdadr.com/arb_awards.asp (last visited July 3, 
2003).  Member firms who refuse to pay arbitral awards are suspended.  Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia 
A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1255, 1356 (2002). 
This system is, of course, not without its critics.  See generally Robert Gregory, Arbitration: It’s 
Mandatory But It Ain’t Fair, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 181 (1991); Therese Maynard, McMahon: The Next Ten 
Years, 62 BROOK. L. REV 1533, 1536 (1996) (claiming that the “industry sponsored arbitration process 
[is] stacked in favor of the securities arbitration defendants”); Norman S. Poser, Securities Arbitration: 
A Decade After McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1996) (criticizing the system because arbi-
trators are not subject to the control that judges exercise over juries); Brooke A. Masters, Meting Out 
Quick Justice in Murky World of Arbitration, WASH. POST, July 15, 2003, at E01 (highlighting how the 
paucity of explanation in decisions undermines the ability to depend on trends and build upon previous 
decisions). 
 180. To ensure that arbitration costs are truly kept reasonable, the statute would also prohibit busi-
nesses and certified arbitration service providers from restricting consumer remedies. 
 181. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 14 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 182. See Alderman, supra note 1, at 1265 (recommending this approach); see also PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 14, at 70, 74 (explaining that a less desirable alternative would be to 
permit predispute arbitration agreements if the arbitration is nonbinding).  Under the Public Citizen 
proposal, a business could still force a consumer to arbitrate, but if the consumer were dissatisfied with 
the result for any reason, she could go to court for a trial de novo.  Id. at  70.  This approach, however, 
would not address the issue of arbitration costs, and allowing consumers a right to appeal does little if 
consumers cannot afford to get through the first round of adjudication.  Id. 
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cost of arbitrating their disputes.  Even after a dispute has occurred, consumers, 
many without representation, do not have all the information they need to 
decide whether to arbitrate.  As explained above, calculating the possible costs 
of arbitration is a complex matter, requiring one to make many assumptions.  In 
addition, consumers may not understand the significance of a clause in an arbi-
tration agreement severely restricting the damages they can collect.  Consumers 
may also fail to appreciate the effect a ban on class actions will have on their 
ability to retain a lawyer. 
Nevertheless, prohibiting mandatory, predispute arbitration agreements in 
consumer transactions would improve upon the current situation.  Businesses 
wanting to arbitrate would carry the burden of persuading consumers it was in 
their best interests to do so.  Consumers could decide whether to choose arbi-
tration under circumstances in which they possessed far more bargaining power.  
At present, it is highly unlikely that consumers signing predispute arbitration 
contracts knowingly waive their right to a judicial forum and agree to arbitrate 
their disputes at a cost substantially greater than the cost of going to court.183  
The arbitration agreement is one paragraph buried in a pile of documents that 
sellers give consumers at the time they purchase goods or services.  At the time 
of purchase, a consumer’s attention is most likely on the price and quality of the 
goods or services, not on any arbitration clause.  Even if consumers read the 
arbitration agreement, they cannot make an intelligent decision about whether 
to agree unless they know what type of dispute they may have with the business, 
what injury they might suffer, and whether court or arbitration would be the 
preferable forum.  Furthermore, the costs of arbitration are not disclosed in the 
arbitration agreements, leaving consumers without warning that actually 
accessing the arbitration forum may be cost-prohibitive.  If predispute manda-
tory arbitration were prohibited, consumers would not be under the time pres-
sure that often is exerted when they purchase goods and services with form 
contracts that include arbitration agreements.  Instead, when a business 
approached them with a proposal to arbitrate, consumers would have the 
opportunity to take the time to consult with others about the best course of 
action.  Although it would be difficult to estimate the cost of arbitration, they 
would be better able to project the costs and compare them with the costs of a 
lawsuit. 
Both businesses and the arbitration service providers would, however, likely 
oppose the prohibition of mandatory, predispute, binding arbitration agree-
ments.  Thus, the AAA has argued that once a dispute has arisen, it is difficult 
for the parties to agree “on any subject,”184 making it highly unlikely the parties 
 
 183. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 14, at 74 (highlighting the inability of 
consumers to “contemplate the consequences of submitting a hypothetical, yet to arise claim to arbitra-
tion”); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 17 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (arguing 
that it is hard to show consumers knowingly and intelligently waived their “constitutional right to a jury 
trial and to access the courts” when they sign standard-form contracts). 
 184. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Arbitration Association at 13, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235), available at 2000 WL 744161. 
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would agree to arbitrate.  It is curious that service providers who lavish praise 
on arbitration in general suddenly have no faith that they can sell their product 
to consumers once a dispute arises.  Advocates of consumer arbitration insist 
arbitration is cheaper, quicker, and easier than litigating in court.185  If they are 
correct, businesses should be able to convince consumers of the advantages of 
arbitration post-dispute.  And, indeed, in some cases arbitration may be advan-
tageous to a consumer’s interests.  When a case involves a simple issue, a small 
claim, or an obvious resolution, a consumer, especially a sophisticated one, may 
be very willing to agree to arbitration.  Under those circumstances, the problem 
may be persuading the business to do so. 
Prohibiting predispute arbitration agreements is not unheard of; mandatory 
arbitration is statutorily prohibited in several countries.186  Because these laws 
have not been repealed, it is reasonable to assume they have not resulted in a 
major disruption of the dispute-resolution process in those countries.  In addi-
tion, in the United States, a number of measures have been taken to protect 
consumers.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, major purchasers of residential 
mortgages in the secondary market, no longer invest in mortgages that contain 
mandatory arbitration provisions.187  The AAA announced in March 2002 that it 
would no longer administer health care disputes unless the parties agree to arbi-
tration post-dispute.188  The AAA also permits consumers to bring cases in small 
claims courts instead of forcing them into arbitration.189  Businesses such as 
Sprint and Sam’s Club include the small claims option in their arbitration 
agreements.190  In limited areas, Congress has acted to ban arbitration, most 
recently by prohibiting automobile manufacturers from requiring arbitration 
with dealer franchisees.191  One might ask why automobile dealers are entitled to 
protection but consumers are not. 
 
 185. See, e.g., Duncan A. McDonald, A Different View on Green Tree Arbitration Ruling, AM. 
BANKER, July 11, 2003, at 8 (claiming that consumer arbitration “usually is faster, cheaper, and less 
bureaucratic than its counterpart in our byzantine court system”).  McDonald is former general counsel 
of Citigroup’s European and North American card business. 
 186. See Alderman, supra note 1, at 1242 n.18; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (explaining that an Alabama statute invalidated all written predispute arbitration 
agreements). 
 187. See Jennifer Harmon, Fannie Mae Ceases Buying of  B&C Loans with Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Feb. 9, 2004), available at 2004 WL 61722230; Press Release, 
Fannie Mae and AARP to Collaborate on Efforts to Build Affordable Housing and Livable Communi-
ties (Feb. 4, 2004), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/faq/231001a.jhtml?p=FAQ; Press Release, 
Freddie Mac Promotes Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy (Dec. 4, 
2003), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/afford_housing/2003/consumer_ 
120403.html. 
 188. See Press Release, American Arbitration Association, AAA Announces Change in Health 
Care Policy (June 13, 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc= 
upload/livesite/About/whatsnew/Health%20Care%20Policy.htm. 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 190. Survey, supra note 4. 
 191. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273  
§ 11028, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). 
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Several bills introduced in Congress in 2003 reflect the variety of ways in 
which a ban on predispute mandatory arbitration might be imposed.  One bill 
targets a single industry: payday lenders.192  Another targets the high-cost mort-
gage market.193  Two others take a much broader approach, covering virtually all 
consumer transactions.194  The bills also differ in terms of how completely they 
prohibit predispute arbitration.  One provides a safe harbor for arbitration 
agreements that meet specified minimum standards.195  Two others contain 
comprehensive prohibitions of all predispute consumer arbitration agree-
ments.196  All the bills permit consumer arbitration agreements executed after a 
dispute arises. 
Among these approaches, the broader are clearly preferable.  Laws that 
target payday lenders and high-cost mortgage firms would certainly alleviate the 
problems millions of people currently face when they confront high-cost arbi-
tration as their only dispute-resolution forum, but consumers outside these 
markets also need protection.  Nor do the proposals that would create safe 
harbors provide a satisfactory answer.  For example, the safe harbor provision 
in House Bill 833 requires that the arbitration clause comply with standards set 
by a nationally recognized arbitration service, such as the AAA advisory com-
mittee, if the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) approves those standards.197  This 
approach has several problems.  First, it imposes bureaucratic burdens on the 
FRB, which must decide what standards, if any, to approve.  Second, the Bill 
seems to treat the AAA’s standards as the model rather than delegating to the 
FRB or another government agency the task of developing standards after 
receiving input from all interested persons.198  The AAA’s competitors 
undoubtedly would establish their own standards, requiring the FRB to deter-
mine whether those other standards are comparable to the AAA’s. 
Furthermore, the Bill is unclear as to whether the business has the burden of 
proving compliance or if the burden falls to the consumer challenging the safe 
harbor.  Litigation undoubtedly would arise over whether the law required 
strict or only substantial compliance with approved standards.  Finally, the 
business would be required to pay the “reasonable costs” of all the parties to 
the arbitration, including the costs associated with the production of witnesses 
and documents.  However, the business would only be required to do so for the 
first two days of arbitration, and the Bill does not define “reasonable costs,” so 
 
 192. H.R. 2407, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 193. H.R. 833, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 194. H.R. 1663, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1887, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 195. H.R. 833. 
 196. H.R. 1663; H.R. 1887. 
 197. H.R. 833. 
 198. On the issue of costs, the AAA’s advisory committee stated merely that arbitration services 
should charge “reasonable costs to consumers based on the circumstances of the dispute, including, 
among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of goods or services provided, and the 
ability of the consumer to pay.”  The advisory committee never resolved the fundamental question of 
whether binding arbitration is appropriate in consumer cases.  See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
Due Process Protocol Protects Consumer Rights, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 13 (1998). 

